Most quantitative investment firms hide their drawdowns inside smoothed pitch decks and cherry-picked rolling averages. At Evergreen Hydra, we believe in mathematical transparency. We analyzed every single trading day entry cohort from January 1996 through October 2026—over 7,749 market sessions—tracking what happened to an investor who deposited $10,000 on that specific day:
| Severity of Drawdown | Account Balance ($10k Basis) | Historical Probability | Odds of Occurrence | Historical Precedent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Any Immediate Paper Loss | < $10,000 | 89.8% | ~9 in 10 investors | Standard daily market noise after entry |
| Minor Correction (5%+) | ≤ $9,500 | 63.4% | ~2 in 3 investors | Routine market consolidation |
| Moderate Drawdown (10%+) | ≤ $9,000 | 32.5% | ~1 in 3 investors | Quarterly sector rotation or earnings gap |
| Substantial Drawdown (15%+) | ≤ $8,500 | 16.6% | ~1 in 6 investors | Macro rate fears or broader market pullback |
| Severe Bear Retracement (20%+) | ≤ $8,000 | 7.1% | ~1 in 14 investors | 2000 Dot-com chop, 2008 Lehman collapse |
| Extreme Crisis Drawdown (25%+) | ≤ $7,500 | 2.3% | ~1 in 43 investors | Late 1998 LTCM debt shock |
| Historic Maximum Drop (30%+) | ≤ $7,000 | 0.5% | ~1 in 200 investors | July 20, 1998 Russian default crash |
| Catastrophic Drop (35%+) | ≤ $6,500 | < 0.1% | 1 single event in 30 years | Hit exactly -35.83% on Oct 27, 1998 |
| Terminal Failure (40%+) | ≤ $6,000 | 0.0% | Zero occurrences | Protected by our algorithm recognizing a need to move into cash |
The takeaway is unmistakable: drawdowns are not a bug or a failure in the model—they are the permanent price of admission for superior compound returns.